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1. Glimmers of hope
Despite the sorry state of East-West relation-
ships, with policies of detente in a shambles,
and the virtual cessation of Soviet-American
negotiations on arms reduction and other mat-
ters, there remain two faint glimmers of hope
that reason and responsibility have not totally
disappeared from contemporary world politics.
One of these is the recent increase in concern
among the major powers’ allies on both sides,
and a consequent tendency toward greater in-
itiatives emanating from European capitals. It
may even be that it takes a sequence of events
as ominous as the Euro-missile crisis to remind
the European elites that they need not be
merely accomplices - and victims - of Soviet
and American stupidity, but that they have
both the responsibility and the possibility of
bringing Moscow and Washington to their
senses.
The second is that the super-powers - even
as they continue to over-arm, to threaten, and
to demonstrate ’resolve’ - appear to be inching
toward a new approach to the arms race di-
lemma. The more traditional approach, going
back to the 1920s, has been upon the slow
negotiation of infrequent, but fairly com-
prehensive treaties, intended to set upper limits
for the signatories in one or a few weapon
categories. Seldom have actual reductions been
sought, but even the establishment of agreed
ceilings has been of only a temporary sort,
soon to be eroded by inadvertent or conscious
violations, or by advances and shifts in
weapons technology. And despite the salutary
results of the ABM and SALT I negotiations,
the vertical and horizontal proliferation of
strategic (and even ’conventional’) weapons
has continued apace since World War II. More
weapons of an increasingly provocative and
destabilizing nature are in the hands of more
nations than ever before, and never have the
objective and subjective conditions for turning
away from major power war been less promis-
ing.
Might there be a more effective approach to
arms limitation and arms reduction? Must we
continue, like Sisyphus, to struggle manfully
up the slippery slope, hoping that each heroic
effort will finally bring us success, only to
discover that we are further than ever from the
plateau of arms stabilization? Before suggest-
ing an alternative, let me indicate why the
search for periodic, large, dramatic, one-shot
agreements has proven so inadequate.
2. Why high-stakes negotiation often
fails
Without getting into the ’origins of the cold
war’ swamp, let us recognize that nearly forty
years of intense East-West rivalry not only
produces distrust and hostility between the
protagonists, along with an inexorable growth
in the arsenals of war, but also some menacing
changes within the contending societies as
well. At each choice point, certain self-
amplifying processes are strengthened. That is,
when we choose to develop or deploy a new
weapon system, we strengthen the position of
those who supported it and weaken the position
318
of those who opposed it. Each allocation of
resources to the military adds to the economic
clout of those who advocated it, and detracts
from those who resisted it. And each decision
to ’hang tough’ enhances the domestic credi-
bility of the hard-liners and diminishes that of
the more prudent and moderate elements.
Further, with each such choice, the cumulative
influence of the ’hawks’ increases, while that
of the ’owls’ and the ’doves’ decreases.
Periodically, of course, a marginal consen-
sus emerges that confrontational policies and
arms build-ups may not be working, and this
awareness typically leads to experimentation
with less bellicose behavior. But given the
increasingly dominant position of the hard-line
factions in the rival power, as well as the
endemic suspiciousness that has inevitably de-
veloped, such ’experiments’ are not likely to
work. When concessions are offered, they are
not promptly reciprocated, and when positive
initiatives are attempted, they are often re-
buffed. And by the time that the rival govern-
ment finally chooses to respond in kind, it is
too late. Once again, the hawks have de-
monstrated that ’there is only one way to deal
with those people’, and the voices of reason
are soon silenced or ignored.
Admittedly, we sometimes see a
groundswell of opinion in favor of less belli-
gerent policies, but it rarely endures. Whether
it be motivated by a recognition of the dangers
to national security, an awareness of the
economic consequences of a continuing arms
race, mere weariness, or even a resurgence of
pacifism, two factors usually stem that tide
with relative ease. One is the tendency of the
rival to be quite unhelpful - even to the point
of increasing its provocative behavior - thus
discrediting the nascent ’peace movement’.
The other is the domestic counter-attack
mounted by those who, for material, psychol-
ogical, or institutional reasons prefer the con-
tinuation or resumption of more militaristic
policies.
In addition to these vested interests - as well
as those who are naive enough to believe in the
arms race as an acceptable basis for national
security - there is another obstacle to success. I
refer here to the psychological syndrome that
inevitably goes with negotiations over very
high stakes. First, there is the anxiety that we
might ’give something away’ that could turn
out to be vitally damaging to the nation’s
security. Hence, we are likely to agonize over
every detail of substance or procedure, looking
for some hidden danger, and call in all sorts of
specialists and technicians to double check.
This not only takes a lot of time, but it creates
great opportunities for different agencies and
offices to obstruct or scuttle a given move.
Second, considering the breadth and magnitude
of the possible bans and limitations, excessive
and time-consuming attention will be given to
the possibility of second- and third-order im-
plications for future strategic developments.
Third, with so much at stake, the natural suspi-
cion of the other side’s motives and honesty is
further exaggerated, providing a field-day for
the devotees of ’worst case analysis’.
Fourth, the longer and more acrimonious the
discussions within and between tha delega-
tions, the greater the opportunity for frustra-
tion, suspicion, and hostility to fester. Fifth,
the combination of technical, strategic, and
emotional complexities tends to make the chief
negotiators even more cautious than they nor-
mally might be. Finally, given the significance
of the putative agreement and the cumulative
clout of the domestic opposition to meaningful
arms control, the negotiators will constantly be
looking over their shoulders to be sure that
they are not politically vulnerable back home
to charges of being ’soft’. Given these
dynamics, it is not surprising that so many can
labor so long, and accomplish so little.
3. Why low-stakes negotiation might
succeed
If this diagnosis is essentially correct, we need
a strategy that recognizes the powerful forces -
political, economic, and psychological - which
stand in the way of major breakthroughs in
arms negotiations or other security-related ef-
forts. The domestic resistance and technical
difficulties must be overcome in a more prag-
matic and piece-meal fashion, and the oppo-
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nents’ skepticism must be ameliorated in an
equally gradual manner. All of this points,
then, to the more incremental and fluid
strategy in pursuit of arms control and arms
reduction that seems to be developing.
If we look at the ways in which nations
handle the equally complex incompatibilities of
interest while nevertheless pursuing certain
shared objectives in other realms, we may find
an instructive example. In trade, investment,
immigration, technology transfer, and even in
many areas of diplomacy, we ordinarily find a
pattern quite different than that employed in
the high politics security sector. The negotia-
tion process is more continuous, the agree-
ments pursued are more limited, the results are
more short-range, and the ebb-flow more fluc-
tuating.
This emphasis on fluid, incremental, and
low stakes bargaining offers certain advantages
that might be applicable to arms negotiation.
By working in the context of a continuous
process, there is greater opportunity for short-
run feedback in which small errors can be
rectified, minor misperceptions modified, tem-
porary violations alleviated, and momentary
stalemates side-stepped. Further, the incre-
mental process permits rolling readjustments
and frequent multiple trade-offs within the
domestic bargaining context. As modest gains
are registered, the resistance of some agencies
and interest groups might be softened, and the
credibility of others enhanced. And as the costs
and dangers of current policies are haltingly
and erratically reduced, one might expect mod-
est shifts in the distribution of domestic opin-
ion as well as in the distribution of influence.
4. Some useful pre-conditions
For such a process to really take hold, and for
the resistance of the hawks and the confidence
of the doves to reverse direction, three addi-
tional activities would be highly desirable. One
is to address and try to ameliorate the material
and symbolic costs that would be incurred by
those in each society who have stood to gain
by the arms race and the accompanying hard-
line policies. Not only economic conversion
and job-retraining, but a range of other adap-
tive moves would be necessary to bring more
groups into the pro-arms control coalition. And
as these elements - in both the Western and
Soviet camps - gain confidence and credibility
while the forces of resistance begin to com-
promise, come around, or drop out, the ability
to withstand temporary reverses would be en-
hanced.
A second set of efforts would be in the
direction of economic, cultural, and diplomatic
reinforcement of these incremental processes.
As minor limitations and reductions of arms
levels begin to emerge, East-West collabora-
tion in these other sectors might become morc
feasible, and thus strengthen the overall ten-
dencies toward detente. Some would contend
that such confidence-building measures must
precede any progress in arms control, but this
seems much more necessary if we continue to
strive for dramatic big breakthroughs than if
we shift to the more incremental, process-
oriented mode. Under the latter strategy, it
would be less critical which sectors we con-
centrate upon first; continuous exploration,
probing, and horsetrading could proceed
whenever the incentives are strong enough and
the obstacles - domestic and foreign - suffi-
ciently surmountable.
A third critical emphasis would be that of an
increasing role for the United Nations system,
particularly the Secretariat. I see this as three-
pronged. One is the need for a gradual shift
away from sole reliance upon national means
of verification and monitoring of the various
limitations and restrictions that have been
negotiated. Another would see the UN playing
a more active role in the mediation of the
disputes that must inevitably arise in such a
complex, delicate and dangerous process as
moving to some sort of durable arms control
regime. The third prong here is that of an
increasingly active role for the Office of the
Secretary-General in preventive diplomacy and
the institution of confidence-building meas-
ures. While the so-called ’conference diplo-
macy’ of the Assembly and the Council con-
tinues, with little effect, it is desirable that the
Secretariat staff initiate a process of what
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might be called ’coalition diplomacy’. In this
vein, past emphasis on the passive availability
of the Secretary-General (when requested by
governments) would shift to a more active and
vigorous intervention into nascent or ongoing
disputes and difficulties. If handled in a skill-
ful, tactful, and competent fashion, such a new
set of initiatives might be found less obtrusive
and more welcome than has been traditionally
assumed.
5. A few possible initiatives
If, as suggested, we may expect greater ac-
tivity on the part of the super-powers’ allies
(and perhaps even on the part of the non-
aligned governments) and some shift toward
more modest, pragmatic, and flexible
negotiating strategies on the part of the Ameri-
cans and the Soviets, what might be done to
get things moving? Are there some plausible
initiatives that might help to improve the cli-
mate and thus increase the attractiveness - and
the likelihood of success - of such low-stakes
negotiations? Given my conviction that the
only really effective confidence-building meas-
ure is arms reduction itself, where might we
look to attempt a new beginning? In as much
land-based counter-force missiles, both in
Europe and America, are the major source of
anxiety and the dominant source of no-confi-
dence in the intentions of the rivals, these
highly provocative and de-stabilizing weapons
ought to get our highest priority. Would it be
too much to expect one or both of the super-
powers to recognize this fact, grasp that these
weapon systems are a serious threat to their
own security as well as their rival’s, and put a
halt to further deployment and ’modernization’
of land-based nuclear delivery vehicles? Would
it be too much to expect the political leadership
in these over-militarized societies to act re-
sponsibly on behalf of their own citizens as
well as the rest of the human race’?
It probably is asking too inuch, given the
extent to which the US and the USSR have
been morally and intellectually corrupted by
their arms rivalry, but if there are any elements
left in these countries who have both the power
and the intelligence, they will move heaven
and earth to halt, and then reverse, the de-
ployment of vulnerable and accurate ballistic
missiles anywhere. Having decided, and acted
for national and global survival by putting a
stop to further deployment - with or without
reciprocity - their next step would be to begin
an incremental phasing out of existing land-
based systems. I do not argue here that sea-
based or air-launched nuclear systems are the
benefactors of humanity, but their existence is
a less immediate threat to the human race, and
can be dealt with when - and if - we see some
signs of progress in reducing the number of
essentially first-strike systems.
6. Conclusion
There are of course, several other ways of
breaking into the arms-tension spiral, and we
ought to be willing to accept and encourage
any reasonable initiative from either side that
holds any promise for a reversal of this deadly
process. But it seems absolutely essential that
we forget about the ’go-for-broke’ negotiations
and start a process of unilateral initiatives,
piece meal offers, tacit concessions, and flexi-
ble coordination between the major powers and
their allies, while attending carefully to the
domestic processes by which we might break
the stranglehold of those who have edged us
closer and closer to the nuclear abyss.
